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Abstract 
Excessive checking is reported in non-clinical populations and is a pervasive symptom 
in Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD). We implemented a free-operant task in 
humans, previously used in rats, wherein participants can “check” to reduce 
uncertainty. Participants can press an observing key to ascertain which of two main 
keys will, if pressed, currently lead to rewards. Over a series of experiments we found 
that punishment robustly increased observing in non-clinical participants and that 
observing persisted long after punishment was removed. Moreover, participants 
appeared insensitive to the initial costs of checking, and a threefold increase in the 
effort required to observe served to deter participants only to a limited degree. We also 
assessed observing in OCD patients with no known comorbidities. The patients 
observed more than control participants and were abnormally insensitive to the 
introduction of punishment. These findings support the translational value of the task, 
with similar behaviours in humans and rodents. This paradigm may serve as a unifying 
platform, promoting interaction between different approaches to analyze adaptive and 
maladaptive certainty seeking behaviours. Specifically, we demonstrate how seemingly 
disparate theoretical and empirical approaches can be reconciled synergistically to 
promote a combined behavioural and cognitive account of certainty seeking.  
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Free operant observing in humans: a translational approach to compulsive certainty 
seeking 
Seeking greater certainty in the face of unpredictability or doubt is commonplace and 
often an effective approach in uncertain or ambiguous situations. Repeated checking 
characterises 15% of the normal population (Stein, Forde, Anderson, & Walker, 1997). When 
excessive, as in compulsive checking, it can lead to considerable distress and impaired 
everyday life functioning. Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD), characterised by 
obsessions and compulsions (APA, 2013), has long been conceptualised as a disorder of 
doubt (Pitman, 1987; Rachman, 2002). Time-consuming checking is one of the most 
common symptoms with prevalence estimates ranging from 50-80% (Antony, Downie, & 
Swinson, 1998; Henderson & Pollard, 1988).   
 Multiple determinants likely play a role in development, escalation and maintenance 
of excessive checking. As such, various psychological, behavioural and cognitive 
neuroscience accounts have been proposed. Checking may arise in response to obsessions, 
intrusive thoughts and fears focusing on impending threat and harm to one’s self or others 
(APA, 2013). Compulsive checking may also be associated with impairments in the ability to 
behave in a goal-directed manner, with increased reliance on habitual actions (Gillan & 
Robbins, 2014). Behavioural inflexibility and inhibitory difficulties may also contribute to 
compulsive checking (Chamberlain, Blackwell, Fineberg, Robbins, & Sahakian, 2005; 
Snyder, Kaiser, Warren, & Heller, 2015), as may impairments in terminating security-related 
behaviours (Szechtman & Woody, 2004). Compulsivity more broadly, is believed to involve 
the dysfunction of parallel, partly segregated, cortico-striato-thalamo-cortical circuits (van 
den Heuvel et al., 2016), with pharmacological and genetic evidence pointing to multiple 
neurochemical system alterations including in dopamine, serotonin and glutamate (Albelda & 
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Joel, 2012; Zai, Brandl, Müller, Richter, & Kennedy, 2014). One key challenge is to integrate 
findings from disparate approaches and different levels of analyses. 
 A potential useful construct in this regard is certainty seeking. Certainty seeking, 
incorporating checking and reassurance seeking behaviours, is found not only in OCD but 
also in Anxiety Disorders, and in other Obsessive Compulsive and Related Disorders such as 
Body Dysmorphic Disorder (Carleton et al., 2012; Coleman, Pieterefesa, Holaway, Coles, & 
Heimberg, 2011). Active certainty seeking, involving reliance on environmental cues, may be 
elicited as a coping strategy to alleviate distress due to perceived uncertainty, threat, and 
excessive doubting. Ambiguity or uncertainty can be aversive to humans and other primates 
(Hayden, Heilbronner, & Platt, 2010; Hsu, Bhatt, Adolphs, Tranel, & Camerer, 2005). 
Intolerance of uncertainty (IU) is a related trans-diagnostic concept, initially developed in 
relation to anxiety but increasingly posited as central to checking, washing and other OCD 
symptoms (Birrell, Meares, Wilkinson, & Freeston, 2011; Lind & Boschen, 2009; Sarawgi, 
Oglesby, & Cougle, 2013). IU refers to experiencing doubt as aversive, whereby high IU 
individuals find even moderate uncertainty stressful or upsetting (Birrell, et al., 2011). There 
is an association between IU and checking compulsions and with OCD patients also reporting 
high levels (Holaway, Heimberg, & Coles, 2006; Tolin, Abramowitz, Brigidi, & Foa, 2003). 
Whilst checking, doubt and IU seem inherently linked, the relation between them appears 
complex. For example, not only can doubt and IU contribute to checking, but checking may 
paradoxically promote doubt, reduced cognitive confidence, and even increased IU 
(Coleman, et al., 2011; Lambrecq et al., 2014; van den Hout & Kindt, 2003).  
Research measuring checking has assessed healthy volunteers and patients using 
introspection and retrospective self-report, and with memory and decision making tasks 
which examine the extent to which participants re-check task-relevant information (Harkin & 
Kessler, 2009; Kim et al., 2012; Rotge et al., 2008; van den Hout & Kindt, 2003). An 
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advantage of behavioural tasks is in allowing the examination of neural correlates of 
checking, with a recent study reporting extensive cortical activations in OCD and healthy 
volunteers (Rotge et al., 2015). Checking poses a challenge inasmuch as participants have to 
check something (e.g., whether two stimuli are the same, or whether one locked the door). 
Thus, such tasks have had to address the role of complex cognitive processes in the checking 
behaviours assessed, such as visuo-spatial processing, memory for actions or working 
memory. 
These lines of inquiry have advanced largely independently of the burgeoning animal 
research (Albelda & Joel, 2012; Eagle et al., 2014; Szechtman et al., 2016). Checking has 
been explored in rodent models of compulsivity where genetics, lesion and pharmacological 
challenges can be used in ways not possible in humans. Following chronic quinpirole 
treatment (a dopamine D2/3-receptor agonist), rats display many repetitive features 
characteristic of human compulsive checking in an open-field environment (Szechtman, 
Sulis, & Eilam, 1998). Recently, an operant task to examine cognitive processes involved in 
checking has been developed and validated in rodents (Eagle, et al., 2014). Based on earlier 
observing tasks (Shahan, 2002; Wyckoff, 1952), rats could press for food pellets on either of 
two levers, but only one was active at a given time. Additionally, rats could press an 
‘observing’ lever to obtain information about which of the two levers was presently active. 
Naturally high checking rats used the observing cue to locate the active lever thereby 
reducing task uncertainty and improving their performance. Chronic administration of 
quinpirole selectively increased functional and non-functional observing, analogous to 
compulsive checking, without influencing the main lever responses. Moreover, the excessive 
observing was reduced following sulpiride administration (a dopamine D2/3-receptor 
antagonist) implicating dopamine D2/3 receptor activation in generating excessive checking.  
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This study presents a line of experiments translating the Observing Response Task 
(ORT) to humans to assess its utility as a unifying behavioural model of checking. As in the 
rodent task, this is a free operant task where participants can press left and right buttons to 
earn rewards. The buttons alternate between reinforcement and extinction schedules, so that 
only one button is active and leads to rewards at a given time. A third, observing button 
activates a cue, allowing participants to ascertain which of the two main buttons is active. 
Participants respond to gain greater certainty in an open-ended yet still controlled situation, 
amenable to behavioural analysis (Szechtman & Woody, 2004). In Experiment 1 we assessed 
whether factors, likely to increase a sense of uncertainty or threat, influence observing in 
humans in the same way as in rodents and whether a similar role for individual differences 
can be detected (Eagle, et al., 2014). In Experiment 2 we explored what role observing costs 
may play in circumstances characterised by threat uncertainty where avoidance, so 
characteristic of OCD, may contribute to certainty seeking. In Experiment 3 we examined 
whether individuals can adapt their ongoing checking levels. We then turned to assess 
whether or not OCD patients indeed observe more, as would be expected.  
 
Experiment 1 
Based on key parametric task manipulations in the rodent ORT, Experiment 1 
examined the consequences of uncertainty by altering various task demands (Eagle, et al., 
2014). Reinforcement uncertainty was assessed by changing the requirements to obtain 
reinforcement compared with baseline, with a greater number of active key presses needed to 
earn rewards. Uncertainty was also assessed by increasing the unpredictability in active key 
location, making the observing schedule less predictable. Finally, as noted above, as 
compulsions are often avoidant in OCD we included a condition where pressing the inactive 
key would lead to punishment. We anticipated that all three manipulations would lead to 
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increased observing levels (Eagle, et al., 2014; Shahan, 2002). Following the individual 
variation in observing behaviour noted in rodents, we confirmed this in the human version. 
Consequently, individuals were assigned to high and low observing groups using a median 
split, to investigate this further.  
Method 
Participants. Seventy nine participants (53 female) with a mean age of 23.69 years 
(SD=2.94) participated and were compensated at a rate £8 per hour. All had normal or 
corrected-to normal vision and hearing, no psychiatric conditions and were free from 
psychotropic medication. The four groups (see below) did not differ in age, 
(F(3,75)=0.99,p=0.40), or gender distribution (χ(3)=1.41, p=0.70). 
Stimuli and apparatus. The main visual display contained the outline of a green 
triangle (sides 7.1°) and purple circle (diameter 6.4°) to either side of the screen (Figure 1A). 
Shape location was counterbalanced within each group. The text ‘Total Earned:‘ and the 
appropriate amount appeared in a rectangle (7° by 1°) centrally below. Pressing the ‘m’ and 
‘z’ keys (labelled with the corresponding colored shape) led to a brief click accompanied by a 
thicker outline (Figure 1B). A ‘t’ keypress caused a light-blue square (8.3° by 8.3°) to appear 
behind the active shape in observing phases (Figure 1C). Rewards were denoted by a fifty 
pence coin below the rewarded side within an orange frame, accompanied by an uplifting 
sound (duration 400 msec). Additionally, the earnings box turned orange and the active side 
shape became filled (Figure 1D). Punishment was a crossed-out coin in a red frame, 
accompanied by an aversive shrill noise (250 msec). The reinforcer utilized multiple 
modalities to ensure saliency and elicit motivation throughout the task. Further, the earnings 
box turned red and the inactive side shape filled with black (Figure 1E). Visual analogue 
scale (VAS) ratings were performed with a horizontal black line (coded from 1 to 30) against 
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a light-grey background. The experiment, programmed using Visual Studio, was conducted 
on a 15.6” laptop with connected mouse, running Windows 7. 
Procedure and design. Participants were seated at a comfortable viewing distance 
and tested individually with the experimenter present. They were told to earn as much as 
possible, but that at any given time only one side will be active. Instructions indicated that the 
active side will alternate over time and pressing the key on the active side will result in 
rewards while the other side will not. Instructions noted participants would receive a 
proportion of their earnings (in practice this was always £5). Training lasted 2-3 min, with 
participants first presented with one shape (counterbalanced across participants) and allowed 
to earn several rewards. Then, for 1 min, both sides were presented with the observing cue 
present and shifting as the active side changed. Finally, the cue was removed and participants 
informed they could press the observing key to produce it, and were asked to do this at least 
once. At the onset of the observing stage, which lasted 10 min, instructions noted that 
pressing the observing key would produce the cue but at a small cost. After a self-terminating 
break, participants received instructions and practiced the post-observing stage (4 minutes) 
where the cue was not available. Analyses of this stage are reported for all experiments in 
supplemental materials. Following a brief break, participants completed another session with 
baseline parameters. Throughout, participants rated how they were ‘feeling right now’ on a 
VAS ranging from very calm to very anxious three times (see Figure 1F).  
Observing responses yielded the cue for 1.5 sec. Rewards and punishments were 
£0.50 and observing responses cost £0.05. Response feedback was immediate with visual 
feedback of non-reward responses lasting 250 msec and of rewards and punishments lasting 
400 msec. No limitations were placed on responses, with the exception that participants could 
not press more than 4 times a second whereupon an error signal sounded and they were asked 
to refrain from going too fast. Sample size was selected on the basis of previous observing 
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and free-operant research. Participants provided written informed consent, and the study was 
approved by the University Ethics Board.  
Baseline was compared with three conditions in a between-subjects design. In baseline, 
each side when active, yielded rewards on a variable ratio (VR) of 14 whereby rewards were 
available on average every 14 presses (range 6-22). The active side switched according to a 
variable time (VT) schedule of 16 sec whereby on average the active side shifted every 16 sec 
(range 4-28). The increased effort (reinforcement uncertainty) condition was identical with 
the exception that it used a VR30 schedule (range 4-56). The increased schedule 
unpredictability condition differed from baseline in that the active side alternated more 
frequently (VT10, range 1-19 sec). Punishment differed from baseline in that rather than 
there being no consequences when participants pressed the inactive button, it now yielded 
punishment on a VR14 (6-22) schedule. Primary outcome indices were observing presses, 
main button presses and anxiety ratings, with the first two reported in rates per minute as in 
the rodent version. Secondary measures consisted of reward rate, total earnings, and where 
relevant punishment rate. Inspection of performance revealed considerable variation in 
observing levels similar to rodent findings (Eagle et al., 2014). In accordance with the 
approach previously adopted, a median split for each group was performed resulting in high 
and low observing styles. Thus the design included four levels of condition: baseline, 
increased effort, increased unpredictability and punishment, crossed with low and high 
observers. Main button presses (MBP) included side (active versus inactive) as an additional 
factor. After the task, participants completed several questionnaires with Latin square 
counterbalancing. The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & 
Erbaugh, 1961), Obsessive Compulsive Inventory (OCI-R; Foa et al., 2002), State/Trait 
Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983) and IU 
(Buhr & Dugas, 2002) were included. The Padua, Metacognitive Questionnaire and 
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Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale were administered but not analyzed (Burns, Keortge, 
Formea, & Sternberger, 1996; Frost, Marten, Lahart, & Rosenblate, 1990; Wells & 
Cartwright-Hatton, 2004).  
Results 
Observing Stage 
Observing. A 4x2 two-way ANOVA was conducted with condition and observing 
style (Figure 2). Median observing rates per minute were 4.15 for baseline, 4.74 for increased 
effort, 5.15 for increased unpredictability and 9.66 for the punishment condition. There was 
an effect of condition (F(3, 71)=5.01, p=.003, ηp2=0.17), stemming from higher observing 
rates with punishment (F(1, 71)=29.96, p<.001). As expected observing style was significant 
(F(1, 71)=95.24, p<.001). Planned comparisons indicated higher observing in high observers 
compared to baseline under increased effort (F(1, 71)=4.83, p=.03), and under increased 
unpredictability (F(1, 71)=5.03, p=.03). In low observers, higher observing rates were only 
found with punishment compared to baseline (F(1, 71)=10.92, p=.001).  
MBP. A 4x2x2 ANOVA with condition, side (active vs. inactive), and observing style 
indicated effects of condition (F(3, 71)=5.16, p=.003, ηp2=0.18), side (F(1, 71)=267.10, 
p<0.001, ηp2=0.79) and the interaction between them (F(3, 71)=7.90, p=.0001, ηp2=0.25; 
Figure 2B). Follow-up comparisons indicated greater active MBP rates in the effortful 
condition compared to baseline (F(1, 71)= 9.89, p=0.002) but no difference in inactive MBP 
(F(1, 71)= 1.67, p=.20). Additionally, under punishment compared to baseline there were 
decreased inactive MBP (F(1, 71)=27.48, p<0.001) but no difference in active MBP (F(1, 
71)= 2.77, p=.10). There was no effect for observing style (F(1, 71)=1.48, p=.23), but an 
interaction between side and observing style (F(1, 71)=68.58, p<.001, ηp2=0.49) stemming 
from a smaller difference between sides for low compared with high observers. Thus, high 
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observers focused their efforts in the active side compared with low observers, indicating the 
utility of observing.  
Rewards and punishments. An ANOVA on rewards with condition and observing 
style indicated effects for condition (F(3, 71)=14.76, p<.001,ηp2=0.38), observing style (F(1, 
71)=11.85, p<.001,ηp2=0.14), and no interaction (F(3, 71)=.42, p=.74). Post-hoc analyses 
indicated lower reward rates under increased effort (M=2.09,SD=0.58), compared to baseline 
(M=3.91,SD=1.42), with no difference between the latter and increased unpredictability 
(M=4.13, SD=1.16) or punishment conditions (M=3.86,SD=1.31). This was expected given 
the reward schedule for increased effort. Additionally, high observers earned slightly more 
rewards (M=3.91,SD=1.43) than low observers (M=3.06,SD=1.26). In punishment, high 
observers received fewer punishments (M=0.29,SD=0.19) than low observers 
(M=0.86,SD=0.52).  
Earnings. An ANOVA with condition and observing style indicated only a significant 
effect for condition (F(3, 71)=17.54, p<.001,ηp2=0.43). There was no significant observing 
style effect (F(1, 71)=2.53, p=.116) and no interaction (F(3, 71)=.52, p=.67). Earnings were 
£7.52 (SD=3.23) for increased effort, £17.67 (SD=4.54) for the uncertain condition, £11.74 
(SD=5.92) for the punished condition and £17.58 (SD=6.65) for baseline. Post-hoc Tukey 
tests indicated reduced earnings for both increased effort and punishment compared to 
baseline (p’s<.001). 
Self-reported anxiety. An ANOVA included condition, observing style as between-
subjects factors and experiment stage as a within-subjects factor. Experiment stage was 
significant (F(2, 142)=5.78, p=.004, ηp2=0.07) and it interacted with condition (F(6, 
142)=4.49, p<.001, ηp2=0.16). Simple interactions indicated a gradual increase in anxiety 
over time for baseline and punishment (F(2, 70)=11.30, p<.001), with values increasing from 
M=7.83, through M=9.66 to M=11.66. There was no change in the remaining conditions 
12 
 
(F(2, 72)=.79, p=.456), with values being M=7.65,  M=6.95 to M=7.12, for first, second and 
third measurements respectively.  
Follow-up session. The follow-up session was examined to ascertain whether 
participants would retain their observing strategy. We therefore report observing in the 
observing stage and self-reported anxiety across the whole session.  
Observing. A two-way ANOVA indicated effects for condition (F(3, 71)=4.59, 
p=.005,ηp2=0.16) and observing style as derived from the first session (F(1, 71)=46.16, 
p<.001, ηp2=0.39) but no interaction (F(3, 71)=.231, p=.874). There were greater observing 
rates under punishment (M=8.08,SD=4.40) compared to baseline (M=4.40,SD=4.13). 
Observing did not differ from baseline (p>.5) in increased effort (M=4.84, SD=5.10) and 
greater unpredictability (M=5.42,SD=3.88). Those who observed more in the first session, 
continued to do so compared with previously low observers (M=8.32 versus M=2.97, 
respectively). 
Self-reported anxiety. The ANOVA included condition, observing style and stage. 
Stage was significant (F(2, 142)=4.17, p=.017, ηp2=0.06) and it interacted with condition 
(F(6, 142)=4.65, p=.0002, ηp2=0.16). The interaction stemmed from decreased anxiety over 
time for the previous punishment (F(1, 71)=28.12, p<.001), with no difference in the other 
conditions (p>.4). 
Questionnaire data 
Self-reported levels of depression, IU, OC symptoms and anxiety and age did not 
correlate with task performance as assessed by observing, MBP or earnings (see 
supplemental materials). Mean VAS anxiety correlated positively with STAI state, (r=0.44, 
t(77)=4.28, p<.001), trait, (r=.40, t(77)=3.85, p<.001), and depression, (r=0.28, t(77)=2.56, 
p=.013). We noted that all measures differed between the four groups. This was confirmed by 
a multivariate ANOVA, (Wilks Lambda=0.613, F(15, 196.40)=2.53, p<.01). Depression, IU 
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and trait anxiety were significant (all p’s<.05) with OC symptom severity showing the same 
trend (p<.07). Post-hoc Tukey tests revealed that the punishment condition led to reporting 
higher symptom levels compared to either baseline, greater uncertainty or both.  
Summary of results 
Threat uncertainty (possibility of punishment) led to greater observing rates regardless 
of response style. In contrast, greater reinforcement uncertainty and increased 
unpredictability in active button location did not lead to robust increased observing, though 
there was some suggestive evidence of this in high observers. Individual differences were 
evident in observing style. Though high observers earned more rewards and avoided 
punishments, this was offset by the cost of observing, so that increased observing did not 
translate into greater earning. Observing was largely functional, and was associated with 
more active side responses and greater inactive side avoidance. Thus, greater observing was 
associated with more rewards overall (r=0.37, t(76)=3.50, p<0.01), and under threat 
uncertainty, with reduced punishment rates (r=-0.71, t(18)=-4.27, p<0.01). Removal of the 
observing cue (see supplemental materials) revealed that participants had not learned the task 
contingencies and could not differentiate between the active and inactive sides. Participants 
in the punishment condition only now pressed less and earned fewer rewards. In the follow-
up session observing remained largely stable within individuals with a strong association 
between the two sessions (r=0.82, t(77)=12.76, p<0.001). Moreover, though informed of the 
removal of punishment, participants did not consequently reduce observing, despite the cost. 
Observing levels did not correlate with self-reported measures. Self-reported trait IU, anxiety 
and depression were reported as higher when following punishment.  
Discussion 
The results demonstrate the translational value of the ORT. Similarly to rodent 
findings, humans could perform the task and observe at will (Eagle, et al., 2014; Shahan, 
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2002). Participants appeared to observe in order to reduce uncertainty with greater observing 
associated with increased active side and reduced inactive side responding. As found in rats, 
humans also employed different strategies with some electing to observe more than others. 
This was not indicative of differences in overall motivation as MBP were similar, and more 
effective responding was offset by observing costs so that with the present outcome 
contingencies high observers did not earn more than low observers.  
 We employed two manipulations used in rodents to increase uncertainty. Previously 
in rats, greater reinforcement uncertainty resulted in increased observing with parameters 
similar to those employed here (Eagle, et al., 2014). When active lever location was more 
unpredictable, only high checking quinpirole treated rats increased their observing rates. In 
humans, manipulations that increased reinforcement uncertainty (increased effort and 
unpredictability) increased observing to some degree, but only in high observers. Thus, in 
both cases, greater sensitivity to uncertainty seems to depend on individual tendencies. 
Greater reinforcement uncertainty did lead to more MBP, particularly on the active side. This 
demonstrates the sensitivity of human performance to reinforcement rates in keeping with 
previous human instrumental task performance (Reed, 2015; Shanks & Dickinson, 1991). 
The introduction of punishment yielded a robust increase in observing, regardless of 
individual differences. This is consistent with the notion that checking escalates rapidly to 
avoid perceived or real aversive consequences. Under threat uncertainty, participants avoided 
the inactive side that led to punishment. This group did not differ in overall responding or 
reward rates, indicating the punishment did not influence overall motivation or task 
engagement as long as observing was available. Preliminary evidence from rodents indicates 
that punishment on the inactive side (foot shocks) also results in greater observing rates 
(Atherton et al., 2014). Upon the subsequent removal of the observing cue (see supplemental 
materials), participants under punishment now responded less and earned fewer rewards. This 
15 
 
reduction was not noted in the other groups suggesting that when uncertainty is coupled with 
unavoidable aversive events, participants adopt an overall avoidant strategy.  
The follow-up session enabled inspection for possible persistence in observing. 
Observing proved highly stable within individuals regardless of changes in uncertainty. 
Participants generally, continued to respond as before (observing style by session interaction: 
F(1,71)=1.77, p=0.19). Moreover, those previously under punishment persisted with high 
observing levels and avoiding the inactive side, despite being informed that there was no 
longer any punishment and despite observing costs. These individuals still reported a drop in 
anxiety over the session. To investigate further, observing in this second session was binned 
into two minute intervals. Observing for the formerly punished remained higher than the 
formerly baseline for four bins (p’s<0.05), dropping to baseline levels only in the final bin. 
Thus, participants demonstrated persistent observing and avoidance of the no-longer 
punished inactive side despite being informed that they would no longer be punished. 
Performance of the previously punished group is reminiscent of the persistence 
reported in OCD patients when cues predicting shocks are devalued (Gillan et al., 2015; 
Gillan et al., 2014). Though a different task, participants are similarly informed that aversive 
consequences would no longer occur. Nevertheless, OCD patients continued to respond in 
order to avoid aversive shocks. Such behaviour has been interpreted as reflecting habitual 
responding rendering behaviour less sensitive to current goals. Present performance in 
healthy participants may be indicative of how easily inflexible responding can develop, being 
insensitive to changes in environmental contingencies. Avoidance behaviours can be 
particularly prone to habitual and rigid control (Gillan, Urcelay, & Robbins, 2016) . Present 
results also dovetail with the finding that repeated checking specifically leads to 
automatization of checking behaviour not only in patients but also in healthy individuals 
(Dek, van den Hout, Engelhard, Giele, & Cath, 2015). Thus, some excessive checking may 
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be triggered from a once-appropriate high level of checking that does not subside due to habit 
or automaticity, even when the need for greater checking diminishes. 
 
Experiment 2 
 Given the robust effect of punishment, we sought to further investigate which aspects 
of threat uncertainty may influence observing. The outcome contingencies in Experiment 1 
meant that though observing was functional and was associated with more rewards and fewer 
punishments, any translation into greater earnings was counteracted by the cost, albeit small, 
of the observing response. Here we assessed whether a greater cost to reducing task 
uncertainty would influence observing. Further, the outcome of an observing response had 
been fully predictable, always yielding the informative cue. One potential factor that may 
contribute to escalation of checking is whether the information gained does indeed reduce 
uncertainty. Checking may not suffice to alleviate uncertainty due to internal factors, such as 
doubt, and/or external factors, such as unreliable information. Therefore, we manipulated the 
reliability of the observing cue. Namely, participants had to press several times to attain the 
cue.  
Compulsive checking is characterised not only by excessive checking but also by its 
non-functional nature. A key observation in the rodent ORT was the presence of ‘extra-
observing button presses’ (EOBP) whereby rats continued to observe despite the cue already 
being available. This rodent procedure involved an observing cue of 30 seconds and the 
administration of quinpirole, neither being feasible in the human procedure. Thus, EOBP 
proved rare in Experiment 1. We speculated that not only would making the cue more 
unreliable increase observing overall, but also that it might serve to increase non-functional 
observing. 
Method 
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Participants. Sixty participants (M=23.87 years, SD=6.01) were compensated at a 
rate of £8 per hour. All had normal or corrected-to normal vision and hearing, no psychiatric 
conditions and were not taking any psychotropic medication. The three groups did not differ 
in age (F(2,57)=1.49, p=0.23), and were matched for gender (11 females per group). 
Procedure and design. The procedure was based on the punishment condition in 
Experiment 1, with three between-subject conditions. FR1 (Fixed Ratio of 1, where every 
observing response yielded the cue) replicated the previous punishment condition, with 
observing costing 5p. In increased cost, the observing schedule was FR1 but the cost for each 
observing response was threefold: 15p. In VR3, the cost was 5p but the observing cue 
appeared every 3 responses on average (range 2-4). Additionally, no follow-up session 
occurred and questionnaires were completed at the session onset. 
Results 
Observing Stage. 
Observing. An 3x2 ANOVA with condition and observing style revealed effects for 
condition (F(2, 54)=35.39, p<.0001, ηp2=0.57), observing style (F(1, 54)=69.98, p<.001, 
ηp2=0.56), and the interaction (F(2, 54)=6.42, p=.003, ηp2=0.19) (Figure 3). Observing style 
was determined by a median split within each condition (8.15, 16.93, and 8.00 for FR1, VR3 
and increased cost, respectively). FR1 and increased cost did not differ, but in VR3 both low 
(F(1, 54)=10.15, p=.002), and high observers (F(1, 54)=44.91, p<.001), had greater 
observing rates compared to baseline low and high observers, respectively.  
In contrast to FR1, not all observing responses under the VR3 condition yielded a cue. 
An analysis of successful observing responses comparing VR3 and FR1, revealed a 
difference (F(1, 36)=9.28, p=.0043, ηp2=0.21), whereby VR3 had reduced rates of successful 
observing compared to FR1. The interaction between condition and observing style was not 
significant (F(1, 36)=2.97, p=.093). 
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We noted an increased frequency of extra-observing button presses (EOBP) in VR3. 
Only 15% of FR1, and 25% of increased cost, in contrast to 65% of the VR3 group had any 
EOBP (χ2(2)=12.31, p=.002). Nevertheless, EOBP rates were still low.  
Main button presses. A 3x2x2 ANOVA included condition, observing style and 
active versus inactive side as independent variables. Side was significant, (F(1, 54)=312.79, 
p<0.001, ηp2=0.85). The interaction between condition and side (F(2, 54)=3.17, p=.0497, 
ηp2=0.11) was due to lower responding in VR3 versus FR1 on the active side (F(1, 54)=4.93, 
p=0.031). There was an interaction between style and side (F(1, 54)=22.14, p<.001, 
ηp2=0.29) with a greater difference between active and inactive MBP for high versus low 
observers (for all other effects p’s>.22). 
Reward and punishment rates and earnings. A one-way ANOVA on rewards did not 
detect significant effects (p’s>.12), though the planned comparison between FR1 and VR3 
indicated reduced reward rates for the latter, (F(1, 54)=4.10, p=.048; M=4.83,SD=1.07 versus 
M=3.86,SD=1.53, respectively). An ANOVA on punishments indicated style was significant 
(F(1, 54)=49.42, p<.001, ηp2=48) with increased punishment in low (M=1.48,SD=0.88) 
compared with observers (M=0.33, SD=0.22). Remaining effects were non-significant 
(p’s>.17). The ANOVA on earnings showed a condition effect (F(2, 54)=10.36, p<.001, 
ηp2=0.28). FR1 earned more (M=£ 16.24,SD=6.96) than VR3 (M=£ 5.51, SD=7.69) or 
increased cost (M=£8.10, SD=8.73), while the latter two did not differ (p>0.29). Remaining 
effects were not significant (p’s>0.23).  
Self-reported anxiety.  
A mixed ANOVA included condition, observing style and experiment stage. Anxiety 
increased as the session progressed: from M=7.60, through M=9.42 to M=11.67 (F(2, 
108)=16.60, p<.001, ηp2=0.239). 
Questionnaires 
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Self-reported depression, IU, OC symptoms and anxiety did not correlate with task 
measures. Age correlated negatively with MBP (r=-0.30, t(58)=2.44, p=.018), and with 
earnings (r=-0.42, t(58)=3.51, p<.001). Mean VAS anxiety correlated positively with STAI 
state (r=0.51, t(77)=4.46, p<.001), trait, (r=.47, t(77)=4.10, p<.001), OCI-R (r=0.28, 
t(77)=2.22, p=.030), and IU (r=0.44, t(58)=3.71, p<.001). There were no group differences in 
questionnaire measure (p’s>0.17). 
Summary of results 
Performance did not appear to be particularly sensitive to the cost of observing, with 
no significant differences between FR1 and Cost groups despite a threefold difference in 
observing expense. VR3 led to greater observing rates, but closer to a two-fold rather than a 
three-fold increase, leading to overall fewer observing cues. This meant less reduction of 
uncertainty and more punishments, which coupled with the presence of unsuccessful 
observing meant less earning. Nevertheless, MBP remained stable as increased punishment 
did not lead to greater avoidance. VR3 was also associated with more EOBP although these 
remained infrequent overall. Given that observing ceased when the cue was extinguished, 
participants largely observed in a goal-directed manner. 
Discussion 
The results indicated that a threefold increase in the cost of observing, be it in effort 
or in earnings, did not deter participants from checking. Individuals in the increased cost 
condition behaved similarly to FR1 and seemed insensitive to the observing cost, resulting in 
reduced earnings. This reinforces the notion that observing levels appear relatively stable, 
with cost, at least with present parameters, playing a minor role. This is reinforced by the 
similar performance in FR1 in this and the previous experiment. At the same time, 
individuals in increased cost did perform better compared with the FR1 group when the 
observing cue was removed (see supplemental materials). Possibly, these individuals learned 
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more from the punishment because the loss of points in the observing stage was more salient. 
Future studies should examine how the value matrix and its change over time may influence 
performance. 
A threefold increase in effort to observe yielded greater observing regardless of 
observing style. However, this was not a threefold increase, and this group did not achieve 
the same level of successful observing. The resulting greater uncertainty was associated with 
less efficient allocation of resources with reduced active side responding so these participants 
earned fewer rewards. This may be due to ceiling effects and points again to the relative 
consistency of observing rates in the current procedure. Thus, at least in healthy volunteers, 
although observing increases with external unpredictability, there is a limit on how much it 
will escalate. This is consistent with the infrequent dysfunctional checking and the refrain 
from observing responses when they no longer served to reduce uncertainty. 
 
Experiment 3 
The previous experiments point to the persistence and relative individual stability of 
checking levels. Here we asked whether individuals escalate their already established 
observing responding when the consequences of uncertainty change. Checking and 
reassurance seeking presumably escalate with increased threat uncertainty and the desire to 
avoid perceived aversive consequences (Grupe & Nitschke, 2013). Specifically, we assessed 
whether individuals adjust their observing with the introduction of punishment. This was 
particularly of interest in low observers as this might provide insight into protective attitudes 
and behaviours in the face of uncertainty. Previous experiments indicated that low observers 
persist in this pattern of responding, enduring greater uncertainty and more punishments. A 
recurring theme emerged during debriefing, of low observers not minding the uncertainty and 
expressing a desire to not rely on external cues available. Thus, here we examined whether 
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punishment, introduced after a baseline period, would lead to the escalation of observing and 
avoidance of the inactive side for all individuals. 
Method 
Participants. Twenty participants (17 female) (M=24.14 years, SD=2.90) took part 
and compensated at a rate of £8 per hour. All had normal of corrected-to normal vision and 
hearing, no psychiatric conditions and were not taking any psychotropic medication. 
Procedure and design. All participants performed the baseline condition followed by 
punishment (FR1). All other aspects were as in Experiment 1 with questionnaires 
administered at the onset. Questionnaire data are reported in Experiment 4 to increase power 
for those analyses. A manipulation check verified that all participants perceived the 
punishment as more aversive. 
Results 
Observing Stage 
Observing. A 2x2 two-way ANOVA was conducted with observing style and 
condition (baseline/punishment), with the latter a within-subjects variable (Figure 4). Median 
split at baseline determined observing style (Md=5.73), with greater levels for high observers 
(F(1, 18)=54.42, p<.001, ηp2=0.75). There was an effect for condition (F(1, 18)=13.39, 
p=.002, ηp2=0.43), with greater observing in punishment compared with baseline. The 
interaction was not significant, suggesting observing increased regardless of style (p=0.30).  
MBP. A 2x2x2 ANOVA included observing style as a between-subjects variable and 
condition and side (active versus inactive button) as within-subject variables. MBP were 
higher on the active versus inactive side (F(1, 18)=201.76, p<.001, ηp2=0.92). There was an 
interaction between condition and side (F(1, 18)=13.34, p=.0018, ηp2=0.43), with the 
difference between the active and inactive becoming larger under punishment. There was 
both increased active MBP (F(1, 18)=5.73, p=.028), and decreased inactive MBP (F(1, 
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18)=12.46, p=.002). There was also a side by observing style interaction (F(1, 18)=25.98, 
p<.0001, ηp2=0.59), with a greater difference for side in high versus low observers. This was 
due to both greater active MBP (F(1, 18)=9.79, p=.006), and reduced inactive MBP in high 
observers (F(1, 18)=26.37, p<.001). Finally, an interaction between condition and style (F(1, 
18)=7.75, p=.012, ηp2=.30), showed that low observers responded less overall in punishment 
compared with baseline (F(1, 18)=10.75, p=.004), but high observers did not (F(1, 18)=0.43, 
p=.518). The three way interaction was not significant (p=0.183). 
Reward, punishment and earnings. There was an effect of style on rewards (F(1, 
18)=9.44, p=.007, ηp2=0.34), with greater rewards in high (M=5.91,SD=0.77) versus low 
observers (M=4.39,SD=1.36). Condition was not significant, p=0.093, nor was the 
interaction, p=0.61. During punishment, high observers experienced fewer punishments 
(M=0.44,SD=0.45) compared with low observers (M=1.23,SD=0.67) (F(1, 18)=9.55, p=.006, 
ηp2=0.34).  
As expected from these results, high observers earned more (M=£23.44, SD=4.64) 
than low observers (M=£17.00, SD=6.23), (F(1, 18)=6.89, p=.017, ηp2=0.27). The ANOVA 
on earnings also indicated condition was significant (F(1, 18)=75.05, p<.001, ηp2=0.81), with 
greater baseline earnings (M=£24.03, SD=5.98) compared with punishment (M=£16.41, 
SD=7.41). The interaction was significant (F(1, 18)=10.50, p=.005, ηp2=0.37), with an effect 
for observing style with punishment (F(1, 18)=12.74, p=.002) but not baseline (F(1, 
18)=1.89, p=.186).  
Self-reported anxiety. An ANOVA with stage, condition and observing style 
revealed an effect for condition (F(1, 18)=51.31, p<.001, ηp2=0.74), with greater anxiety in 
punishment (M=13.52, SD=7.20) compared with baseline (M=8.65,SD=5.89). Anxiety also 
increased across stages within each condition (F(2, 36)=17.33, p<.001, ηp2=0.49). There was 
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also an interaction (F(2, 36)=5.52, p=.008, ηp2=0.23) such that anxiety rose more within 
punishment compared with baseline.  
Summary of results 
Introduction of punishment led to a robust rise in observing in participants regardless 
of observing style. Further, participants used the cue and avoided the inactive side, focusing 
their efforts on the side yielding rewards. Unavoidable punishment in the post observing 
stage conveyed information allowing participants to favor the active side but also led to less 
responding overall (see supplemental materials). Though observing style was a secondary 
factor, we noted that low observers made fewer MBP and did not seek as much information 
to reduce the uncertainty and so received fewer rewards and more punishments compared 
with high observers. All this served to make them earn less overall in punishment. Anxiety 
levels increased as the task progressed, with the introduction of punishment and then with the 
removal of the observing cue and resulting greater punishment rates.  
Discussion 
The main findings indicate that the introduction of threat uncertainty, as implemented 
by punishment, resulted in greater observing not only across individuals (Experiment 1) but 
also within individuals. Hence, individuals are sensitive to changes in the consequences of 
uncertainty with checking behaviours escalating to avoid anticipated threat. Regardless of 
initial observing levels, punishment had a robust effect, with participants avoiding the 
inactive side. This is even more striking given that this approach was intuitively adopted by 
participants without any instructions. Whilst low observers checked more under punishment, 
they consistently observed less than the high observers. Consequently, they were less 
effective in concentrating their efforts on the active side and avoiding the punished side, 
receiving more punishments and earning less overall. Thus, those who engaged in greater 
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observing initially, benefited from this strategy under punishment, demonstrating the utility 
of observing within current parameters. 
 
Experiment 4 
 The first three experiments served to validate the ORT and provide information about 
the role of anticipated threat in the escalation and maintenance of checking behaviours. A key 
prediction emerging from the evidence thus far, would be that individuals with OCD, who are 
characterised by excessive doubt and IU (Holaway, et al., 2006; Tolin, et al., 2003), would 
adopt a strategy similar to that of high observers. Given that OCD patients exhibit extensive 
avoidant behaviours (Ettelt et al., 2008) and are presumably hyper-sensitive to threat 
uncertainty (Grupe & Nitschke, 2013), the introduction of punishment could possibly serve to 
escalate observing excessively in this group. To assess these predictions, we tested OCD 
patients and a control group using the same procedure as in Experiment 3. 
Method 
Participants. Twenty-one OCD patients and 21 healthy controls participated (see 
Table 1). Patients met Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) 
criteria for OCD but not other axis-I disorders as determined by a detailed structured clinical 
interview with a psychiatrist. All but one patient were prescribed serotonin reuptake 
inhibitors with four receiving an adjunct antipsychotic, one an adjunct antidepressant and one 
receiving both, and another prescribed pregabalin. One patient was also prescribed lithium 
carbonate. Controls had no current or past psychiatric disorders as determined by a screening 
interview including the Mini International Neuropsychiatric Interview (MINI; Sheehan et al., 
1998), and were not taking any psychoactive medications. For all participants, exclusion 
criteria included current or past neurological disorders or brain damage.  
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Design, procedure and apparatus. The experiment was identical to Experiment 3 
with the following exceptions. The design included group (OCD, controls) and observing 
style (low, high observing) as between-group variables and condition (baseline, punishment) 
as a within-subject variable. Prior to testing, symptom severity was assessed with the Yale-
Brown Obsessive-Compulsive Scale (YBOCS; Goodman et al., 1989). Verbal IQ was 
assessed with the National Adult Reading Test (NART; Nelson, 1982) and depression 
symptom severity was assessed with the Montgomery-Asberg Depression Rating Scale 
(MADRS; Montgomery and Asberg, 1979). At the end, all participants reported perceiving 
the punishment as aversive. Participants performed additional tasks not reported here. The 
experiment was run on a 17.3” laptop with connected mouse, running Windows 7. The 
Cambridge Local Research Ethics Committee (08/H0308/65) approved the study.  
Results 
Observing Stage 
Observing. A 2x2x2 three-way mixed ANOVA revealed effects for group (F(1, 
38)=5.19, p=.028, ηp2=0.12) and observing style (F(1, 38)=39.39, p<.001, ηp2=0.51), but not 
condition (F(1, 38)<1, p=.47). Observing median split indicated medians of 4.15 and 7.7 for 
controls and patients, respectively. All two-way interactions were significant though the 
three-way interaction was not (F(1, 38)<1, p=.99). The group by condition (F(1, 38)=6.35, 
p=.016, ηp2=0.14) indicated greater observing rates in patients compared with controls in 
baseline (F(1, 38)=17.44, p<.001), but not punishment (F(1, 38)<1, p=.92) (Figure 5). 
Secondary comparisons assessed the finding of increased observing with punishment was 
replicated in each group. This was found in controls (F(1, 38)=5.25, p=..027, ηp2=0.20), but 
not patients who showed a non-significant decrease (F(1, 38)=1.62, p=0.21, ηp2=0.06). The 
group by observing style (F(1, 38)=5.13, p=.029, ηp2=0.12) indicated no difference in low 
observers (F(1, 38)<1, p=.99), but increased rates in patients compared with controls in high 
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observers (F(1, 38)=4.44, p=.042). The observing style by condition (F(1, 38)=8.90, p=.005, 
ηp2=0.19) stemmed from greater observing in punishment only in low observers.  
MBP. A four-way 2x2x2x2 mixed ANOVA revealed effects for side (F(1, 
38)=188.31, p<.001, ηp2=0.83), and condition (F(1, 38)=17.42, p<.001, ηp2=0.31). There 
were two-way interactions between condition and group (F(1, 38)=19.60, p<.001, ηp2=0.34), 
condition and observing style (F(1, 38)=19.20, p<.001, ηp2=0.33), and observing style and 
side (F(1, 38)=20.24, p<.001, ηp2=0.34). Finally, there was a three way interaction between 
condition, group and side (F(1, 38)=9.09, p=.005, ηp2=0.19). This stemmed from the controls 
responding more on the inactive side under baseline. With the introduction of punishment, 
controls avoided the now punished side responding similarly to patients. 
Reward, punishment and earnings. The three-way mixed ANOVA on reward rates 
revealed no significant effects (p’s>.22) with mean reward rates being 3.64 (SD=1.39) and 
3.23 (SD=1.39) for controls and OCD patients, respectively. An ANOVA on punishment 
rates revealed only an effect for observing style (F(1, 38)=7.12, p=.011, ηp2=0.16), with 
greater punishment for low (M=1.31, SD=0.86) compared with high observers (M=0.62, 
SD=0.82).  The ANOVA on earnings showed an effect of condition (F(1, 38)=45.35, p<.001, 
ηp2=0.54), with reduced earnings in punishment (M=£8.64, SD=8.40) compared with baseline 
(M=£14.30, SD=7.53). There was also an interaction between condition and observing style 
(F(1, 38)=16.83, p<.001, ηp2=0.31), such that high- earned more than low observers during 
baseline but not punishment, presumably due to increased observing in the latter group. 
Self-reported anxiety. An ANOVA with group, observing style, condition and stage 
revealed effects for group, (F(1, 38)=13.83, p<.001, ηp2=0.27) with greater anxiety in patients 
(M=12.99, SD=7.00) compared with controls (M=5.79, SD=5.50). Additionally, there was an 
effect for stage, (F(2, 76)=15.18, p<.001, ηp2=0.28) with anxiety levels being 8.28 , 9.23 and 
10.66 for measurements 1 through 3, respectively (see Figure 1f). Condition was also 
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significant (F(1, 38)=4.25, p=.046, ηp2=0.10), with levels higher in punishment (M=9.83, 
SD=7.18) compared with baseline (M=8.95, SD=7.22). Finally, there was an interaction 
between group, observing style and stage (F(2,76)=6.26, p=.003, ηp2=0.14), resulting from 
increased anxiety in high observing patients following removal of the observing cue 
(F(1,38)=17.15, p<.001). 
Questionnaires 
Data regarding associations between task performance and questionnaires were 
combined for Experiments 3 and 4 to increase power, as they employed the same procedure 
(see Table 2). Baseline observing correlated positively with trait anxiety. Baseline MBP 
correlated negatively with all questionnaires. Similarly, punishment MBP correlated 
negatively with OC symptoms, depression and anxiety, as did earnings. As in Experiment 2, 
age was negatively associated with MBP and with earnings. VAS anxiety correlated 
positively with all questionnaire self-reported measures (see Table 2). We further tested 
whether OCI checking would correlate with baseline observing. There was a significant, 
albeit modest, correlation (r=0.30, t(60)=2.41, p=.019). Given the importance of IU, we 
assessed the two subscales and noted a significant correlation between baseline observing and 
factor 2: “uncertainty is unfair and spoils everything” (Sexton & Dugas, 2009), (r=0.32, 
t(60)=2.62, p=.011). However, any interpretation must consider the exploratory nature of this 
analysis. 
Summary of results 
OCD patients exhibited increased baseline observing and, unlike controls, did not 
adjust this with the introduction of punishment. With higher observing during baseline, the 
patients already avoided the inactive side despite no aversive consequences. When 
punishment was introduced controls now observed like patients, whilst patients persisted in 
the same pattern. Overall, OCD patients did not obtain more rewards nor did they earn more 
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than controls and their greater baseline observing did not translate into a more effective 
response strategy. When punishment was introduced controls avoided it to the same extent. 
Thus, excessive avoidance of the inactive side in patients did not entail increased active side 
responding. For all participants, anxiety rose following the observing stage, increasing further 
with the removal of the observing cue. OCD patients reported feeling more anxious 
throughout compared with controls, with removal of the cue resulting in even greater anxiety. 
Observing levels were somewhat preserved across the task, with a moderate 
association between baseline and punishment (r=0.44, t(61)=3.87, p<0.001). Questionnaire 
data yielded several observations: a) older participants pressed at slower rates and earned 
less; b) increased trait anxiety was associated with greater baseline observing, with OC 
symptoms, IU and negative mood not reaching significance although being positively 
correlated; c) higher levels of OC symptoms, IU and negative mood were all associated with 
reduced MBP responding both during baseline and punishment, thereby being associated with 
poorer earnings. 
Discussion 
 This experiment showed that OCD patients indeed demonstrate elevated levels of 
certainty seeking in the ORT. Contrary to the prediction, punishment did not lead them to 
seek even greater certainty. Whilst controls increased observing to avoid the inactive and now 
punished side, patients appeared insensitive to the introduction of threat uncertainty. Possibly, 
patients were at ceiling. However, even higher observing levels were noted in VR3 in 
Experiment 2, precluding this notion. It is more likely that once patients adopted a particular 
strategy, this was not easily adapted to a changing environment, indicative of the general 
inflexibility often characterizing OCD (Snyder, et al., 2015). It is further possible that 
impaired response control under punishment, presently manifested in this rigid and abnormal 
strategy (Morein-Zamir et al., 2013). The results from the main button instrumental 
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responding indicate that not only did patients observe more at baseline, but also that they 
used this information to avoid the inactive side despite limited negative consequences. 
Nevertheless, their increased observing did not translate into greater earnings. 
 Controls who observed more were shown here as in Experiment 3 to use this 
information to gain more rewards. High observing in patients however did not translate into 
more active side responding. This points to a potential dissociation between the tendency in 
patients to seek certainty and their ability to use this information effectively. Thus, although 
one could have anticipated an advantage to greater certainty seeking, at least in terms of 
rewards gained, this was not the case. This is reminiscent of previous findings where unlike 
controls, OCD patients failed to adjust their checking in response to external error signals 
(Rotge, et al., 2015), further pointing to rigid, non-functional certainty seeking in OCD. 
 This study replicated the finding of greater observing with the introduction of threat 
uncertainty in an older community sample of healthy individuals, as was found between 
groups (Experiment 1) and within participants (Experiment 3). We noted an interaction 
between response style and condition, not evidenced in Experiment 3. However, high 
observers comprised both patients and controls and the three-way interaction was not 
significant suggesting caution in interpreting any role of response style. Consideration of 
response style does however point to individual differences in this construct even in the 
patients. 
 
General Discussion 
This study assessed checking behaviours and contributors to compulsive checking in 
humans, using a free operant ORT previously validated in rats (Eagle, et al., 2014). Checking 
was operationalised as observing responses whereby individuals could reduce uncertainty, 
and gain information about the task. The results indicated that the ORT is translational, 
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showing similar patterns of behaviour in rodents and humans. Experiment 1 showed that 
threat uncertainty leads to increased certainty seeking which persists even when the threat is 
removed. Experiment 2 revealed that with the outcome contingencies employed, participants 
appear insensitive to initial checking costs and similarly a threefold increase did not deter 
participants from observing, though to a lesser extent. Experiment 3 confirmed individuals 
would escalate their checking when threat uncertainty is introduced, whilst Experiment 4 
revealed elevated observing levels in OCD patients, who were abnormally rigid when 
punishment was instated.  
The ORT offers a unifying method for cultivating interactions between research 
approaches. Theoretical constructs from different levels of analyses can be integrated to 
better understand compulsive checking and certainty seeking. Psychological concepts 
believed to contribute to the development of compulsive checking, such as IU, may be 
coupled with cognitive constructs such as impaired response inhibition and excessive rigidity 
(Linkovski, Kalanthroff, Henik, & Anholt, 2015; Morein-Zamir, Fineberg, Robbins, & 
Sahakian, 2010). Compulsive certainty seeking may be further exacerbated and maintained 
by weakened or weakening goal-directed control in the face of perceived or anticipated threat 
uncertainty, possibly manifested by beliefs such as enhanced responsibility (Gillan, et al., 
2014; Grupe & Nitschke, 2013; Ladouceur, Rhéaume, & Aublet, 1997; Lind & Boschen, 
2009). The ORT could promote formal assessment of psychological concepts in ways 
amendable to brain imaging (in humans), lesions (in rodents) and pharmacological 
manipulations (in both). 
Relevance for translational models of compulsive checking and learning theory 
Present findings offer further validity to the quinpirole-induced OCD animal model, as 
developed in the ORT (Eagle, et al., 2014). Specifically, purposeful use of the observing cue 
was found in both rodents and humans, with the task capturing individual variability in 
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observing in all populations examined. Inflexible observing was evidenced in the quinpirole-
treated rats who were unresponsive to increased variability of response requirements on the 
active lever. Though we did not perform this manipulation in patients, they exhibited 
inflexible responding when threat uncertainty was introduced. The behavioural rigidity may, 
as in rats, be associated with disruption of frontostrital dopamine (Floresco, 2013). An 
important difference was the prevalence of non-functional observing in the rats, which was 
rarely seen in humans. Notably, for the rats no cost was associated with observing, whilst 
here a small cost (10% of reward magnitude) was present and observing cue duration was 
considerably briefer (1.5 versus 15 sec). Nevertheless, some EOBP was noted (Experiment 3) 
suggesting such non-functional responding can be elicited in humans. 
The present procedure employed graded yet brief training, with participants only told to 
earn as much as possible. The latter is line with the rodent ORT where animals are required to 
earn rewards. This differs considerably from human observing research which typically 
employ complex idiosyncratic scenarios (Case & Fantino, 1989). Minimal instruction may be 
particularly beneficial in tasks where simpler mechanisms found in rodents could account for 
behaviours previously explained by higher-order constructs, such as confidence and meta-
cognition (Kepecs & Mainen, 2012; Kepecs, Uchida, Zariwala, & Mainen, 2008). The 
present procedure can nevertheless, be adapted to incorporate OCD-related themes such as 
enhanced responsibility (Arntz, Voncken, & Goosen, 2007; Ladouceur, et al., 1997). 
 
The learning literature has pointed to multiple factors seemingly contributing to observing 
behaviour (Case & Fantino, 1989; Shahan & Cunningham, 2015). The conditioned-
reinforcement account focuses on the cue having conditioned reinforcing properties via 
association with positive reinforcement (Fantino, 1998; Fantino & Silberberg, 2010). The 
uncertainty reduction hypothesis focuses on the information provided by the cue (Lieberman, 
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Cathro, Nichol, & Watson, 1997). This has been complicated by the notion that response 
efficiency (or utility) and uncertainty reduction per se are also potentially reinforcing 
(Fantino & Silberberg, 2010; Lieberman, et al., 1997). The two-lever paradigm employed 
here, which ensures that unlike in previous observing studies, participants are continuously 
on task, may further clarify contributors to observing. In present form observing a) served to 
reduce uncertainty, b) provided useful information and c) likely acquired secondary 
reinforcer status. Notably, the ORT has the advantage of employing these multiple 
contributors to checking as found in everyday life, thereby increasing its external validity. 
Investing distinct contributions of uncertainty reduction versus any reinforcing properties of 
checking would elucidate how maladaptive checking develops. 
Relevance for cognitive and neuropsycholoigcal models of compulsive checking 
The ORT provides an alternative approach to current certainty seeking procedures, which 
typically involve deciding whether to go back and verify a previously seen stimulus or 
reporting some aspect following multiple checks (Harkin & Kessler, 2009; Kim, et al., 2012; 
Rotge, et al., 2008). Observing does not rely on explicit memory or confidence in one’s 
memory, is unlikely to involve visuospatial difficulties or be driven by stimuli idiosyncrasies. 
Aberrant checking as noted in OCD patients here may be independent of these processes, 
adding to the mixed support for their involvement in compulsive checking (Clair et al., 2013; 
Cuttler & Graf, 2009). Excessive doubt, reliably seen in memory (Muller & Roberts, 2005), 
likely extends to other cognitive domains, and may have contributed to present OCD 
performance.  
Self-reported anxiety levels tended to rise with task progression, particularly when 
participants experienced punishment but also during baseline. The latter effect could be 
attributed to a persistent state of uncertainty (De Putter, Van Yper, & Koster, 2017).  
Observing levels were moderately associated with anxiety in Experiments 3-4 where anxiety 
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was not range restricted (see also supplemental materials). With the removal of the observing 
cue, anxiety increased in patients but not controls. This was noted even without the threat of 
punishment, further reinforcing the link between uncertainty and anxiety. There was also an 
association of observing with self-reported checking and aspects of IU, though an 
independent replication of this is warranted. The association between anxiety and observing 
emphasises the trans-diagnostic nature of certainty seeking (Boelen & Carleton, 2012). 
Further, elevated observing was noted in the OCD patients, although they were not selected 
for checking compulsions. Instances of checking, such as reassurance seeking may also 
manifest in increased observing, given that observing can be a coping strategy fostering a 
sense of control (Coleman, et al., 2011; Parrish & Radomsky, 2010; Starcevic et al., 2012). In 
rodents there was no clear relationship between anxiety, such as elevated plus maze 
performance, and ORT measures (Eagle, et al., 2014). However, the quinpirole model of 
OCD, manipulating striatal dopamine, does not appear to be related to anxiety (Vorhees, 
Johnson, Burns, & Williams, 2009). Serotonergic manipulations in the ORT may uncover 
such relationships given the efficacy of SSRIs in both OCD and anxiety disorders.  
Reduced instrumental responding (MBP) was associated with increased self-reported OC 
symptoms, depression and anxiety, particularly prior to the introduction of punishment. This 
suggests a general avoidant strategy, though one that did not extend to observing, possibly 
due to its reinforcing properties. The revised reinforcement sensitivity theory (Gray & 
McNaughton, 2000) can accommodate the seemingly opposing pattern of associations. In this 
framework OCD and anxiety symptoms follow from overactivity of the checking mode in the 
behavioural inhibition system (BIS), which together with the Fight-Flight-Freeze System 
(FFFS) can lead to avoidance behaviours, such as suppression of the prepotent instrumental 
responses. Increased sensitivity to ambiguous cues, involving overactive FFFS and BIS 
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(Heym, Kantini, Checkley, & Cassaday, 2015), would also underlie IU with the BIS eliciting 
checking as a defensive approach. 
 In any case, caution should be used when relating behavioural indices with retrospective 
self-report measures, in healthy volunteers but particularly in patients where insight may be 
compromised. Further, as demonstrated in Experiment 1, self-report of traits and of long-term 
behaviours can be biased by situational variables such as recent experience of punishment.  
Strengths, limitations and future directions 
 This study presents a novel approach to certainty seeking, investigating behavioural 
indices and self-report measures in healthy volunteers and OCD patients with no 
comorbidities. The patients were chronically medicated and the role of medication, 
particularly SSRIs, should be explored. Additionally, the patients were not selected for 
checking compulsions and any overlap between everyday compulsive checking and 
observing remains to be established. Nevertheless, as proposed above, observing may capture 
a broader range of certainty seeking behaviours such as compulsive washing and reassurance 
seeking. Experiment 4 did not include a clinical control group, which would clarify whether 
the increased yet rigid observing is specific to OCD, although given the transdiagnostic 
nature of certainty seeking, this may not be the case. Future research should assess observing 
in relation to specific compulsions and to anxiety disorders.  
 Examination of healthy individuals can help elucidate the conditions under which 
certainty seeking increases, and how compulsive aspects may develop or be maintained. 
Thus, for example, it appears observing escalates easily, as evidenced with the introduction of 
punishment (Experiments 3 and 4). But once established, observing is difficult to reduce, 
even if the environment has changed and it no longer serves the same functional role 
(Experiment 1). Only a weak association between observing and self-reported measures was 
noted (see also Harkin & Kessler, 2009), possibly due to range restriction as participants were 
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screened, and/or from non-clinical checking involving different causes and serving a function 
role, such as to counteract impaired working memory. Care must be taken when generalizing 
between non-clinical and clinical samples as seemingly excessive or abnormal behaviour in 
non-clinical samples may arise through different mechanisms altogether (Cuttler & Graf, 
2009). Even in clinical samples, compulsive checking is promoted by multiple psychological, 
cognitive and situational variables. 
 The complex behaviour of free-operant responding may also avail itself to 
sophisticated analyses and hypothesis-driven computational modelling, already advancing the 
understanding of decision making in uncertain and ambiguous situations (Kepecs & Mainen, 
2012; Kiani, Corthell, & Shadlen, 2014). Observing levels appeared stable within individuals. 
It remains to be determined whether this extends over longer durations and whether it is 
associated with everyday certainty seeking behaviours rather than retrospective self-report.  
To conclude, this study supports the translational value of the ORT, which appears 
promising for the investigation of the neuropharmacological and neural basis of compulsive 
checking.  
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Table 1. Means and standard deviations of control and OCD patient group characteristics 
  Controls 
(n=21) 
OCD 
(n=21) 
  
Characteristic Measure M (SD) M (SD) t p 
Age Years 39.1 (11.9) 45.2 (12.8) 1.5 0.11 
Gender M:F 10:11 10:11   
Verbal IQ NART 112.2 (7.0) 115.4 (5.6) 1.4 0.15 
Years Education 13.8 (1.8) 13.9 (1.9) 0.3 0.81 
Obsessions & 
Compulsion 
YBOCS 0.0 (0.2) 22.43 (5.7) 18.0 <0.001 
Depression MADRS 2.8 (3.1) 8.5 (4.7) 4.7 <0.001 
Depression BDI     
State Anxiety STAI-S 33.2 (10.2) 49.6 (11.3) 4.9 <0.001 
Trait Anxiety STAI-T 38.0 (10.5) 63.1 (8.9) 8.3 <0.001 
IU IU     
Obsessions & 
Compulsion 
OCI-R  10.8 (9.6) 34.8 (9.4) 8.2 <0.001 
 
Note. NART=National Adult Reading Test; YBOCS=Yale-Brown Obsessive Compulsive 
Scale; BDI=Beck Depression Inventory; STAI-S= State/Trait Anxiety Inventory-State; 
STAI-T = State/Trait Anxiety Inventory-Trait; IU= Intolerance of Uncertainty; OCI-
R=Obsessive Compulsive Inventory-Revised. 
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Table 2. Correlations between task performance and individual characteristics for all 
participants in Experiments 3 and 4. 
 
 Age Depression Intolerance 
of 
Uncertainty 
OC 
symptoms 
State 
Anxiety 
Trait 
Anxiety 
Observing 
- baseline 
.17 .20 .23 .23 .20 .27* 
Observing-
punishment 
-.11 .07 -.00 -.11 .04 .00 
MBP-
baseline 
-.41** -.30* -.31* -.43*** -.33** -.39** 
MBP-
punishment 
-.42** -.24 -.20 -.27* -.26* -.25 
Earnings -.41** -.26* -.21 -.36** -.33* -.31* 
VAS .03 .50*** .44** .44*** .59*** .49*** 
 
Note, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. MBP=main button press; VAS= mean visual analogue 
scale. 
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Figure 1. Schematic figures of the free operant Observing task and procedure. At any given 
time only one of the sides (and hence shapes) is active, thereby yielding rewards, whilst the 
other side/stimuli is inactive. Participants can press either of two keys to earn rewards (Panel 
A). Key presses lead to the shape outline on the active side becoming briefly thicker and are 
accompanied by a click (Panel B). Participants may press the centre blue observing key to 
check which side is currently active. Observing results in a light blue square appearing (1.5 
sec) behind the shape on the active side (Panel C). Rewards are conveyed by a filled symbol 
on the active side, points and an uplifting noise (Panel D).  In the punishment condition, 
pressing on the inactive side yields punishment (see text for details). Punishments are 
conveyed by a symbol filled in black on the inactive side, loss of points and an aversive noise 
(Panel E). The procedure involves two successive sessions comprising of a main observing 
phase followed by briefer post observing stage where the observing cue is extinguished. 
Participants also rate their current level of anxiety on a visual analog scale (VAS) throughout 
the task (Panel F). 
Panel 1A. 
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Panel 1B.
 
 
 
Panel 1C. 
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Panel 1D. 
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Panel 1E. 
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Panel 1F.
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Figure 2. Mean observing rate for high and low observers (Panel A) and mean button press 
for active and inactive sides (Panel B) in Experiment 1. Error bars depict the standard error of 
the mean. OBS=observing; MBP = mean button press. 
Panel 2A. 
 
 
 
Panel 2B. 
 
 
  
55 
 
Figure 3. Mean observing rate for high and low observers (Panel A) and mean button press 
for active and inactive sides (Panel B) in Experiment 2. Error bars depict the standard error of 
the mean. OBS=observing; MBP = mean button press. 
Panel 3A. 
 
 
Panel 3B. 
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Figure 4. Mean observing rate for high and low observers (Panel A) and mean button press 
for active and inactive sides (Panel B) in Experiment 3. Error bars depict the standard error of 
the mean. OBS=observing; MBP = mean button press. 
Panel 4A. 
 
 
Panel 4B. 
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Figure 5. Mean observing rate for the control and OCD group (Panel A) and mean button 
press for active and inactive sides for the two groups (Panel B) in Experiment 4. Error bars 
depict the standard error of the mean. OBS=observing; MBP = mean button press; 
OCD=Obsessive Compulsive Disorder.  
Panel 5A. 
 
 
Panel 5B. 
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Supplemental Materials  
 
Additional Analyses 
Below are analyses of performance during the post observing stage where, though 
observing responses were monitored, they did not lead to the cue. To summarize, in all 
experiments participants acted in a goal-directed manner in accordance with instructions, and 
ceased observing when the cue was removed.  
Associations are also presented between self-report measures and baseline MPB and 
observing rates, in low and in high observing individuals separately (we thanks an 
anonymous reviewer for suggesting these analyses). To summarize, the pattern of 
associations reported in the main text for Experiments 3 and 4 was found within each sub-
group. A similar pattern of associations was found for low observers in Experiment 1. The 
presence of punishment in Experiment 2, which led to greater observing levels overall, likely 
precluded these associations from emerging. Future studies may investigate the robustness of 
the associations at baseline given the moderate effect size and that high observers in 
Experiment 1 do not show similar results. 
Experiment 1 
Observing. Over 92% of participants made no observing responses, with the 
remaining pressing rarely and likely inadvertently. 
MBP. An ANOVA with condition, side and observing style indicated an effect for 
condition (F(3, 71)=5.12,p=.003,ηp2=0.18). Post-hoc analyses revealed reduced responses 
under punishment (M=59.12,SD=11.38) compared to baseline (M=61.62,SD=14.06), with no 
difference between baseline, increased effort (M=71.64,SD=11.21) and increased 
unpredictability (M=70.54,SD=12.21). Side was not significant (F(1, 71)=.01,p=.923) 
indicating that without the observing cue, participants were unable to determine reliably the 
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active side. MBP rate was 65.86 (SD=18.81) and 65.60 (SD=17.41) for active and inactive 
sides, respectively.  
Reward, punishment and earnings. An ANOVA with condition and observing style 
on reward rate indicated condition was significant (F(3, 71)=12.64, p<.001, ηp2=0.35). Post-
hoc analyses revealed reduced rewards for increased effort (M=1.42, SD=0.73) and for 
punishment (M=2.35,SD=1.21) compared to baseline (M=3.51,SD=1.64), but no difference 
between the latter and increased unpredictability (M=3.41,SD=1.10). No other effects 
reached significance (p>.5 for all). Similarly, the ANOVA on earnings showed only a 
condition effect (F(3, 71)=28.35, p<.001, ηp2=0.54). Post-hoc analyses indicated reduced 
earnings for increased effort (M=2.82,SD=1.45) (M=6.99,SD=3.28) and punishment 
(M=1.12,SD=2.33) compared to baseline, but no difference between the latter and increased 
unpredictability (M=6.80,SD=2.18). Under punishment, there was no difference for 
punishment between low (M=1.66, SD=1.15) and high (M=1.90,SD=0.27) observers (F(1, 
18)=.45,p=.509).  
Questionnaires. The results are shown in Table S1. 
Experiment 2 
Observing. No participants observed in FR1 and only 4 in VR3 and in increased cost, 
though rarely.  
MBP.  There were no effects for condition or observing style, but responding was 
greater for active (M=71.12,SD=23.60) versus inactive side (M=51.75,SD=13.44; F(1, 
54)=31.71, p<.001, ηp2=0.37). An interaction between condition and side, (F(2, 54)=4.54, 
p=.015,ηp2=0.14), was such that active side responding was greater for increased cost 
compared to FR1 (all other effects p’s>.16). 
Reward, punishment and earning. ANOVAs on rewards or punishment revealed no 
significant effects, though there was a marginal effect for condition on reward (F(2, 
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54)=2.66, p=.079), with greater reward rates for increased cost (M=4.27,SD=1.96) compared 
to FR1 (M=3.01,SD=1.57). Condition influenced earnings, (F(2, 54)=3.24,p=.047, ηp2=0.11), 
with post-hoc analyses indicating this stemmed from greater earnings in increased cost 
(M=£3.92,SD=4.34) than FR1 (M=£0.77,SD=3.94).  
Questionnaires. As reported in the main analyses, there were no significant 
correlations. 
Experiment 3 
Observing. One participant observed at baseline and none under punishment.   
MBP. A three-way ANOVA included observing style, condition and side. MBP were 
lower in punishment (M=60.17, SD=16.36) compared with baseline (M=70.15, SD=10.46), 
(F(1, 18)=13.328, p=.0018, ηp2=0.43). MBP was greater for active (M=71.82,SD=18.67) 
versus inactive side (M=58.50,SD=10.28), (F(1, 18)=11.09, p=.004, ηp2=0.38). Observing 
style was marginal (F(1, 18)=3.96, p=.06), with greater MBP in high (M=70.25, SD=6.49) 
versus low observers (M=60.07, SD=14.75). No other effects were significant (all p’s>0.33). 
Reward, punishment and earnings. Participants earned more rewards in baseline 
(M=4.33,SD=1.33) compared with punishment (M=2.93,SD=1.00), (F(1, 18)=11.17, p=.004, 
ηp2=0.38) and had higher earnings (F(1, 18)=67.80, p<.001). Previously high observers 
experienced more punishment (M=2.51,SD=0.90) than low observers (M=1.66,SD=0.74) 
(F(1, 18)=5.34, p=.033).  
Experiment 4 
Observing. Two controls and 5 patients observed infrequently, with no group 
difference (p=.21).   
MBP. An ANOVA with group, observing style, side and condition revealed 
interactions between group and condition (F(1, 38)=7.83, p<.01, ηp2=0.17), observing style 
and condition (F(1, 38)=4.25, p=.046, ηp2=0.10), and side and condition (F(1, 38)=5.64, 
p=.02, ηp2=0.13). During baseline, but not punishment, controls responded more than patients 
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and low observers responded more than high observers. An interaction between group, 
observing style and side (F(1, 38)=7.72, p<.01, ηp2=0.17), stemmed from the previously low 
observing controls responding more on the inactive side compared to previously high 
observing controls with no such difference in patients. 
Reward, punishment and earnings. Participants earned fewer rewards in punishment 
(M=1.79,SD=0.72) compared with baseline (M=2.45,SD=0.83), (F(1, 38)=24.49, p<.001, 
ηp2=0.39). While there were no effects on punishment, an ANOVA on earnings revealed 
greater baseline earnings (M=£4.86,SD=1.65) with participants losing on average in 
punishment (M=£-0.13, SD=1.27), (F(1, 38)=121.37, p<.001, ηp2=0.76). There was also a 
group by observing style interaction (F(1, 38)=7.45, p<.01, ηp2=0.16), due to a crossover, 
though no pairwise comparison reached significance.    
Questionnaires. The results combining data from Experiments 3 and 4 are shown in 
Table S2, and are consistent with the results reported in the main text.  
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Table S1. Correlations between task performance and individual characteristics for low and 
high observers in Experiment 1. 
 Depression Intolerance 
of 
Uncertainty 
OC 
symptoms 
State 
Anxiety 
Trait 
Anxiety 
Low observers      
Observing - 
baseline 
.16 .16 .34* .42* .48* 
MBP-baseline -.34* -.12 -.36* -.34* -.28 
High observers      
Observing - 
baseline 
.00 .07 -.01 -.01 .01 
MBP-baseline -.03 .14 .13 .03 .09 
 
Note, * p<.05, ** p<.01 
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Table S2. Correlations between task performance and individual characteristics for low and 
high observers in Experiments 3 and 4. 
 Depression Intolerance 
of 
Uncertainty 
OC 
symptoms 
State 
Anxiety 
Trait 
Anxiety 
Low observers      
Observing - 
baseline 
.20 .36* .33 .22 .27 
MBP-baseline -.20 -.34 -.38* -.27 -.39* 
High observers      
Observing - 
baseline 
.39* .38* .48** .37* .39* 
MBP-baseline -.43* -.31 -.54** -.41* -.38* 
 
Note, * p<.05, ** p<.01 
 
